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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OE UTAH 
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U T A H P O W E E
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
P R E I J M I N , \ II Y STATEMEN T 
After appellant filed its initial brief, the Supreme 
Court of Colorado in Simpson v. Anderson, 526 P.2d 
298 (Colo. 1974) held that informing the jury of the 
effect of its answers to the interrogatories was contrary 
t<> the int"irl khiiid th" comparative negligence stat-
ute Thus Th" Supreme Court reversed thr Colorado 
intermediate court decision which the l:ial judge in the 
instant case relied upon in granting ^l.iiiiliff's motion 
for a new trial. 
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The undisputed facts, as stated in appellant's and 
respondent's brief, show that the plaintiff was injured 
when he and four of his companions were carrying a 
sailboat with a 26 foot aluminum mast toward the north 
shore of Bear Lake when the mast struck defendant's 
power line. 
Issues raised in plaintiff's brief and cross-appeal 
are answered below. 
P O I N T I 
S INCE T H I S CASE WAS T R I E D U N D E R 
T H E I D A H O C O M P A R A T I V E N E G L I -
G E N C E S T A T U T E , T H A T S T A T U T E ALSO 
CONTROLS T H E M A N N E R I N W H I C H T H E 
CASE IS S U B M I T T E D TO T H E J U R Y . 
From the outset of the trial there was agreement 
that this case would be tried under the Idaho Compara-
tive Negligence Law. An important part of that statute 
is §6-802, which states: 
"6-802. Verdict giving percentage of negli-
gence attributable to each party.—The court 
may, and when requested by any party shall, 
direct the jury to find separate special verdicts 
determining the amount of damages and the per-
centage of negligence attributable to each party; 
and the court shall then reduce the amount of 
such damage in proportion to the amount of neg-
ligence attributable to the person recovering." 
[1971, ch. 186, §2, p. 862.] 
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Further, it is evident from the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in Holland v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728, 
518 P.2d 1190 (1974) that it is improper for the at-
torneys or the court to inform the jury as to what effect 
its answers to the special verdict will have on the final 
outcome of the case. Now respondent is arguing that 
this part of the Idaho Comparative Negligence Law 
should not have been applied in the trial. He claims 
whether or not to inform the jury is merely a procedural 
matter, and under the accepted conflict of laws rule, 
the procedural rules of the forum state (Utah) should 
be applied. 
However, respondent oversimplifies what is pro-
cedural and what is substantive. In essence, he would 
allow the court to try this case under the Idaho Com-
parative Negligence Statute, but would refuse to permit 
the court to use the underlying policy which makes this 
law operate in the effective manner intended by the 
Idaho legislature. This policy goes to the heart of the 
Idaho Comparative Negligence Statute, and for the 
Utah court to apply the Idaho law without also applying 
the clearly enunciated Idaho rule on comment to the 
jury would be to emasculate the Idaho law and subvert 
the very purpose of the statute—that being to convert 
the jury into an exclusive fact-finding body removed 
from the sway of passion or prejudice. Obviously this 
policy is part of the substantive Idaho law. 
There are no hard and fast rules governing what 
is substantive and what is procedural. Professor Mor-
3 
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gan, in his aiticle entitled "Choice of Law Governing 
Proof" (58 Harv. L. Rev., p. 153, 1944) states: 
". . . The time has passed when the decision of 
important questions should turn on mere classi-
fication or upon the willingness or unwillingness 
of judges to pour enlarged meaning into old def-
initions. I t is time to abandon both the notion 
and the expression that matters of procedure are 
governed by the law of the forum. I t should be 
frankly stated that (1) the law of the locus is to 
be applied in all matters of substinance except 
where its application will violate the public policy 
of the forum; and (2) the law of the locus is to 
be applied in all such matters of procedure as 
are likely to have a material influence upon the 
outcome of the litigation except where (a) its 
application will violate the public policy of the 
forum or (b) weighty practical considerations 
demand the application of the law of the forum." 
Id. at 195. 
The law regarding permissible comment and in-
struction to the jury is likely to have a material influ-
ence upon the outcome of this litigation. Further, since 
the policy that it is improper to inform the jury of the 
effect of its answers to the special verdict is part of the 
law of every jurisdiction which has a comparative neg-
ligence statute similar to Utah's, there is no reason why 
applying this Idaho rule would violate Utah's public 
policy. Therefore, Idaho's policy that it is improper to 
inform the jury of the effect of its answers to the special 
verdict should be considered as an essential part of the 
Idaho Comparative Negligence substantive law and 
should be applied in this case. 
4 
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There can be no doubt that a comparative negli-
gence statute along with its underlying policies is not 
merely procedural but affects the substantive rights of 
the parties. In Chism v. Phelps, 311 S.W.2d 297 (Ark., 
1958) the court, in considering this issue stated: 
"While no simple formula can be evolved to de-
termimne the difference between the two (com-
parative negligence and contributory negli-
gence), we think the right of a party plaintiff 
to recover substantial damages even though he 
is 10% or even 49% negligent involves a sub-
stantive right and is not a matter of procedure." 
Id. at 300. 
If the forum state chooses to apply the compara-
tive law of a foreign jurisdiction, as Utah has done in 
this instance, must the Utah court merely adopt the 
whole of the foreign state's law or can the court merely 
accept the basic framework of submitting special inter-
rogatories to the jury for its percentage findings, but 
reject the underlying principals and policies essential 
to the operation of this law? To allow a court to do 
this would be to subvert the entire rationale for apply-
ing the foreign law. Such reasoning was followed in 
Fitzpatrick v. International By. Co., 169 N.E. 112 
(N.Y., 1929) when a New York court held: 
" . . . As we have said, the Ontario (Compara-
tive Negligence) Act goes beyond a matter of 
procedure and gives a right unknown to the com-
mon law, the right of an injured person to re-
cover for another's negligence, even though con-
tributing by his own neglect to bring it about. 
5 
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For these reasons the trial court was quite correct 
in charging the jury in accordance with the 
Ontario statute. 
The appellant suggests that, as this act does not 
refer to the burden of proof, the plaintiff, under 
our form of procedure, should have the burden 
of proving either freedom from contributing 
negligence or else the degree to which his own 
negligence contributed. We have no such law 
in this state. To follow the appellant's sugges-
tion would still require our courts to adopt a por-
tion of the Ontario statute. If we adopt a part 
we must apply it as a whole, because it affects 
the substantial rights of the parties" (emphasis 
added) Id. at 115. 
Appellant respectfully submits the Idaho policy 
of not permitting a jury in a negligence case to be 
informed of the effect of its answers is clearly an 
integral part of the substantive law of that jurisdiction. 
The Utah court, when it applied the Idaho Compara-
tive Negligence statute in this case, was correct in its 
initial ruling that the whole of the Idaho law, including 
this essential policy, should govern the trial. 
P O I N T I I 
U N D E R T H E U T A H C O M P A R A T I V E 
N E G L I G E N C E L A W , T H E J U R Y S H O U L D 
NOT BE ADVISED OF T H E E F F E C T I T S 
P E R C E N T A G E F I N D I N G S H A V E ON T H E 
OUTCOME OF T H E CASE. 
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Even if this court should rule that this essential 
Idaho policy is procedural and not substantive, and thus 
apply Utah procedure, it should have no effect on the 
final outcome of this appeal. Utah law on this point 
should follow every other comparative negligence juris-
diction, and it is respectfully submitted that this court 
should adopt the rule permitting no comment to the 
jury regarding the effect of its answers to the special 
verdict. 
Appellant agrees that this is a matter of first im-
pression under Utah's new comparative negligence law. 
I t was shown in appellant's brief that every other com-
parative negligence jurisdiction including Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, Arkansas, Tennessee, Colorado and Idaho 
have found after experience with this system that com-
parative negligence works best and most efficiently if 
the jury is not informed of the effect of its percentage 
findings. Respondent argues that even though Utah's 
comparative negligence law was patterned after the 
Wisconsin and Idaho statute, Utah should not adopt the 
Wisconsin and Idaho rule regarding comment on the 
percentages. The only case respondent could cite which 
substantiated his position was a decision by an inter-
mediate Colorado court, Simpson v. Anderson, 517 P.2d 
416 (1974) which held that the jury should be advised 
of the effect its findings had upon the verdict. However, 
on September 9, 1974, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
reversed this case holding: 
"During closing argument, counsel for the 
respondent-defendant informed the jury that the 
7 
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plaintiff would be entitled to recover only if the 
jury found the plaintiff less negligent than the 
defendant. Such comment or explanation to the 
jury is contrary to the intent behind our com-
parative negligence statute: (1971 Perm. Supp., 
C.R.S. 1963, 41-2-14). We hold that comment, 
explanation, or instruction to the jury on the 
effect of its answers in the special verdict form in 
negligence cases is clearly improper under our 
comparative negligence statute. We therefore 
find that reversible error exists and that this 
cause must be remanded for a new trial." (em-
phasis added). Simpson v. Anderson, 526 P.2d 
298 (1974). 
See also Avery v. Wadlington, 526 P.2d 295 
(Colo. 1974), a companion case to Simpson in which the 
Colorado Supreme Court more fully sets out its rea-
sons for adopting the "no comment rule." 
With Simpson reversed, respondent cannot point 
to even one comparative negligence jurisdiction which 
has adopted the rule which he is now urging the Utah 
courts to adopt. The reason these other states, includ-
ing our sister states of Idaho and Colorado, have all 
adopted the no comment policy is that they recog-
nize such a policy is essential if the underlying concept 
of the jury operating solely as a fact-finding body is to 
be achieved. 
Under the Utah comparative negligence statute, 
the division of responsibility between the court and jury 
is evident. The jury is the finder of fact and simply 
answers special questions based on what it determines 
the facts to be. By stature, the court applies the law 
8 
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and brings about the result by appropriate judicial 
order. Under this system, it is not the jury's function 
to attempt to understand the comparative negligence 
law nor to attempt to have the effect of this law 
reflected in its answers to the special verdict. Jury in-
volvement is therefore greatly simplified, even in very 
complex multiple party, multiple claim, multiple issue 
cases. 
Where a jury is tolcl only what it needs to know 
under proper instructions integrated with the special 
verdict form, a jury's thought processes and function 
are channeled along specified lines. Since it is not 
necessary for the jury to concern itself with how much 
the plaintiff receives, the policy makes it more likely 
that a "pure verdict" unaffected by passion, prejudice 
or misunderstanding will be obtained. A jury will sim-
ply carry out its function and while in some instances 
it may wonder or perhaps even know the effect of par-
ticular findings, it will not concern itself with that as-
pect of the case because it is clearly not part of the 
jury's sworn duty. 
On the other hand, if the jury is given unnecessary 
information as to the effect of its special findings, and 
emphasis is placed upon the particular percentage find-
ings necessary to bring about a particular result, the 
jury may very well believe that it is a jury function 
to cause a certain end result and thus may adjust its 
percentage allocations and monetary award accordingly. 
Take for example the trial of the present case, 
9 
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where the jury found the plaintiff's negligence to be 
60%. The jury answered the special interrogatory to 
that effect because that was its described function, and 
neither the attorneys nor the judge suggested that the 
jury should be aware of the end result. The jury may 
have felt sorry for the injured plaintiff and wanted 
him to receive something, but the instructions, special 
verdict and conduct of the trial clearly defined its func-
tion, and the jury did not go beyond it. If the jury is 
informed of the effect of its answers and mistakenly 
tries to perform the court's function, it will inevitably 
fail to carry out its function under the comparative 
negligence law. Telling the jury invites confusion, 
injects unnecessary collateral information and encour-
ages the jury to succumb to the effects of passion and 
prejudice, thus abandoning its role as a strict finder 
of fact. 
The facts in McGinn are relatively simple and 
involve only two parties. Many cases, however, can 
become quite complex with multiple issues, multiple 
parties, crossclaims and counterclaims. If a jury is sim-
ply directed to answer specific questions with the court 
then to apply the law, even complicated cases can be 
tried with relative ease. But, if the jury is told about 
the effect its answers will have on each issue and party, 
the case will be impossible to control and the jury will 
certainly end up confused. In fact, it would probably 
be impossible in a multi-issue, multi-party case for the 
court to draft instructions explaining the mechanics of 
the comparative negligence law in a manner which is 
10 
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comprehensible to layman jurors- A policy of the jury 
operating as fact-finders is far superior to respondent's 
suggested policy which, in complicated cases, would 
result in chaos. 
The special verdict concept of channeling jury 
thought and function along specified lines is nothing 
new in Utah. I t is seen daily in other areas of the 
law. Jurors in criminal cases are not told about what 
sentence an accused could receive if convicted and the 
jury does not fix the penalty. The reason is that the 
jury function is only to determine guilt or innocence, 
not to determine the legal result of that finding. The 
jury is not told whether there is insurance in a case 
and what the limits of coverage are. The jury is not 
informed whether or not the plaintiff has been paid in 
full or in part by his own insurance. Further, the jury 
is not told whether the accident is covered by workman's 
compensation so that a portion of plaintiff's recovery, 
if any, will be paid to the compensation carrier. I t is 
deemed improper to tell the jury that attorneys' fees 
will come from the award; that the plaintiff will receive 
interest from the date of judgment; and that plaintiff 
will not be required to pay income tax on the judgment. 
The reason the jury is not told is that the jury does 
not need to know and its findings should not be influ-
enced and perhaps prejudiced by unnecessary collat-
eral issues. 
Plaintiff argues that such a policy of no comment 
demonstrates a distrust of the jury system. This is sim-
11 
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ply not the case. The issue is not one of "distrust" at all. 
The problem is that the jury does not need to know 
and is particularly ill-suited to attempt to understand 
and apply the comparative negligence statute. I t is 
not a matter of distrust, but rather a recognition that 
jurors often allow sympathy to cause them to violate 
their oath to return a verdict based on fact. A concise 
statement of the reason for the rule of no comment 
is contained in Wright v. Convey, 349 S.W.2d 344 
(Ark. 1961): 
The reason for the rule is that the special inter-
rogatories are intended to elicit the jury's un-
biased judgment upon the issues of fact, and this 
purpose might be frustrated if the jurors are in 
a position to frame their answers with a conscious 
desire to aid one side or the other, (emphasis 
added). 
One of the foundation stones of comparative negli-
gence is its policy of a fact-finding jury which returns 
a "pure verdict" by way of the special verdict pro-
cedure. Emasculation of this main feature of the law 
and the procedural nightmare that will result should 
not be permitted. Utah should follow the precedent of 
every other comparative negligence state by not inform-
ing the jury of the effect its answers will have on the 
final outcome of the case. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E I N S T R U C T I O N TO T H E J U R Y 
E X P L A I N I N G T H E LACK OF R E L A T I O N -
12 
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S H I P B E T W E E N T H E P E R C E N T A G E S O F 
R E L A T I V E F A U L T AND DAMAGES WAS 
P R O P E R . 
A. The Special Verdict Clearly Set Out The 
Fact That The Jury Should Ignore The Percentage 
Of Relative Fault Interrogatory When Answering 
The Damage Interrogatory. 
Under comparative negligence, the jury deter-
mines the percentage of fault and also finds the total 
damages. If the jury holds by its percentage finding 
that the defendant is at least 51% at fault, the court 
performs the necessary mathematics to determine the 
dollar amount of the verdict. A comparative negligence 
jury should be made aware that it should answer the 
damage interrogatory without considering its answers 
to the preceeding fault interrogatories. This require-
ment was clearly met by the instruction given in the 
McGinn damage interrogatory which read: 
"Question No. 4. Disregarding any of the previ-
ous answers, what is the total amount of 
damages sustained by plaintiff F . William 
McGinn I I as a result of the incident?" (em-
phasis added). 
In plain and concise English this instruction told the 
jury to disregard its answers to the previous fault inter-
rogatories and find the total amount of plaintiff's dam-
ages. There is no evidence on the record that the jury 
was confused in this regard. Its finding of $150,000.00 
general damages and $18,150.00 special damages was 
13 
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what they believed plaintiff's total damages to be. This 
instruction was proper and sufficient, and not miscon-
strued by the jury. It must be presumed that the jury 
followed the clear instructions given to it by the court, 
and disregarded its previous answers to the fault inter-
rogatory. Any instruction which went into too much 
detail on this point would have tended to overempha-
size the percentage figures, thus causing the jury to 
improperly guess at their meaning and to stray from 
its fact-finding role. 
B. Respondent Has Waived His Right To Ob-
ject To The Interrogatory On Damages. 
Both parties submitted requested instructions and 
a special verdict form to the court. Respondent's re-
quested special verdict (R 188) was couched in lan-
guage which tended to inform the jury of the effect 
its answers had on the final outcome of the case and 
was refused by the judge. After a discussion concern-
ing what form the damage interrogatory should take, 
the court decided upon the language quoted in sub-
section A. After the instructions and special verdict 
were read and the jury retired to deliberate, respondent 
made various objections and exceptions to specific in-
structions (R 886-887). Respondent did not object or 
except to the giving of the damage interrogatory, nor 
did he request the instruction he now argues should 
have been given. Respondent admitted this during the 
argument on the motion for a new trial. On page R 930-
931 of the record, counsel for respondent stated: 
14 
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" . . . and admittedly I didn't make this request 
at trial but I think you have the discretion to 
consider it now. 
Although I did not request this instruc-
tion at the time of trial, I feel it is excusable 
neglect in view of the fact that it is the first 
trial any of us have tried . . . " 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gov-
erns this point. I t states in pertinent part: 
. . . If the instructions are to be given in 
writing, all objections thereto must be made 
before the instructions are given to the jury; 
otherwise, objections may be made to the instruc-
tions after they are given to the jury, but before 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party 
may assign as error the giving or the failure to 
give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In 
objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party 
must state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection." 
Another sentence of Rule 51 says: 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, 
the appellate court, in its discretion and in the 
interests of justice, may review the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction." 
This language gives the court discretion under cer-
tain circumstances to review the giving or refusal to 
give a requested instruction. This language is not ap-
plicable in the case at bar since here we are dealing 
with an instruction which was not requested or pre-
sented to the court and which is not contained in this 
record on appeal. Counsel's argumemnt on this point 
15 
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is not based on the record and should be disregarded 
in the interests of justice. 
Utah courts have consistently refused to permit an 
appeal based upon instructions which were not objected 
to at the time of trial. In Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah 
2d 63, 475 P.2d 839 (1970), where plaintiff appealed 
based upon the giving of an erroneous instruction, the 
court stated: 
"Such error, at best a highly debatable one, 
was not urged at the trial but for the first time 
on appeal. Our rules say, and repeatedly we 
have said that such exception must be asserted 
and made a matter of record at the trial level, 
failing which it is not reviewable on appeal 
except where unusual and compelling circum-
stances exist calling for correction by the exist-
ence of sound discretion. Such circumstances 
are not apparent here." 475 P.2d at 840. 
Respondent should have objected or excepted to 
the giving of the damage interrogatory at trial. Even 
though afforded ample opportunity, respondent made 
no such objection. I t was only after the adverse jury 
verdict that the respondent manifested any objection 
to an interrogatory with which he had seemed perfectly 
happy. Therefore, under the law respondent should be 
precluded from objecting to the damage interrogatory 
in this appeal since he took no steps to timely preserve 
the question at the time of trial. Further, respondent 
cannot appeal based upon an instruction which he nei-
ther requested or presented to the court until after 
the jury verdict. 
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C. Since The Jury's Answer To The Percentage 
Of Fault Interrogatories Made The Damage Inter-
rogatory Irrevalent, Said Damage Interrogatory, Even 
If Incorrect, Constituted Harmless Error. 
The jury considered the percentage of fault inter-
rogatory and found the plaintiff more negligent than 
the defendant. Under the Idaho comparative negli-
gence law such a finding dictated a judgment of no 
cause of action regardless of what the jury found the 
damages to be. Thus, once the jury determined that 
the plaintiff was 60% negligent, any finding on dam-
ages was irrelevant. 
Of course, appellant takes the position that the 
language of the damage interrogatory was clear, con-
cise and proper. But even if the damage interrogatory 
were to be held improper, the giving of that instruc-
tion was harmless error due to the jury's answers to 
the previous fault interrogatory. To argue otherwise 
respondent would have to convince the court that some-
how the jury's determination of the damages affected 
its percentage findings. However, it is clear from the 
record that the jury answered the percentage of rela-
tive fault interrogatory based upon the facts elicited 
at trial. The jury's finding that the greater fault lay 
with the plaintiff negated any importance of the dam-
age interrogatory. Thus, the utmost an improper dam-
age instruction could constitute in this case would be 
harmless error, and it is well established Utah law that 
a jury verdict will not be overturned on the basis of 
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harmless error. See Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-Day 
Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960) ; 
and Wilson v. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 87, 348 P.2d 931 
(1960). 
P O I N T IV 
T H E T R I A L COURT P R O P E R L Y R E -
F U S E D TO A D M I T C E R T A I N P H O T O -
G R A P H S . 
A few days after the accident, defendant's em-
ployees assigned to the area nailed warning signs on 
two poles on the 46 KV line bordering the accident 
area (Exhibits 66p, 67p and 68p). The signs nailed 
to the poles were identical to Exhibit 58p. 
The photographs of the signs on the poles were 
offered in evidence during the testimony of a Utah 
Power & Light employee, Mr. Daniel James Ray-
mond, District Representative of the Montpelier, Idaho 
District which includes the Camp Lifton area. 
Plaintiff asked the court for a cautionary instruc-
tion that the photographs were not to be considered as 
evidence of negligence but were offered to show: the 
practicality and ease with which the signs could have 
been put up; to impeach the testimony of Mr. Ray-
mond ; and on the issue of whether or not the plaintiff 
was a trespasser at the time of the accident (R 797-798). 
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Mr. Raymond stated on direct examination he was 
familiar with the signs (R 794), that there was a sup-
ply of the signs in the Montpelier Office (R 794) and 
that they were sent out with the information that they 
should be put around irrigation systems (R796). When 
Mr. Raymond was asked if it would have been practi-
cal and feasible to place the signs in recreational areas 
he answered yes. 
Q (By Mr. Roberts) Is there any reason why 
that couldn't protect someone with any kind of 
a long pole? 
A (Mr. Raymond) Any reason it couldn't? 
Q Yes. 
A I don't see why it couldn't, if they would read 
it, yes. 
Q And it would have been practical and feasible 
to take this very sign and place it on various 
poles around in the state park west of Lifton, 
would it not? 
A I think there would be any observing of pipes 
being raised or anything of this sort it may have 
been. 
Q I t would have been practical and feasible is 
my question. Is the answer to that yes? 
A It is, yes. (R797) 
After a recess was taken so the court could hear 
arguments on the admissibility of Exhibits 66p, 67p 
and 68p, Mr. Raymond was called back to the stand and 
asked: 
Q (By Mr. Roberts) Just a few more matters, 
Mr. Raymond. One thing, where we left off, 
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would you agree with me, sir, that as of July 
1972 before this accident happened there was no 
particular reason why this sign could not have 
been used in a recreational area had you seen 
fit to do so? 
A (Mr. Raymond) I think that is what I said 
just before the recess. (R 708) 
The photographs were not admissible to impeach 
Mr. Raymond's testimony because he admitted it would 
have been practical and feasible to put the signs in the 
area where the accident happened (R 797, 708 p 486). 
By claiming the photographs should have been 
allowed in evidence to show that it would have been 
practical and feasible to put the signs up, plaintiff obvi-
ously was offering the Exhibits to show negligence. The 
admission of the Exhibits would have clearly violated 
Rule 51, Rules of Evidence, which states: 
Subsequent Remedial Conduct. When after the 
occurrence of an event remedial or precaution-
ary measures are taken, which, if taken previ-
ously would have tended to make the event less 
likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent 
measures is not admissible to prove negligence 
or culpable conduct in connection with the event. 
(emphasis added). 
N O T E : This rule relates only to negligence 
and not to causation. It is not intended to ex-
clude evidence which might be admissible on 
other grounds, independent of such provisions. 
The ruling of the court in refusing to admit the 
photographs was in accord with the Rules of Evidence 
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and also in accord with the earlier Utah case of Potter 
v. Dr. TV. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 99 
Utah 71, 103 P.2d 280 (1940) where this court held: 
" . . . Evidence of alterations or repairs to prem-
ises under his control made following an acci-
dent therein is inadmissible to show as against a 
defendant that the former condition was unsafe 
or was being negligently maintained, (empha-
sis added). 
This rule is recognized in practically all jurisdic-
tions. See annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Re-
pairs, Change of Conditions or Precautions Taken 
After Accident, 64 ALR2d 1298. 
Since the accident happened on Utah Power & 
Light property, defendant claimed one of the issues was 
whether or not the plaintiff was a trespasser and if so, 
what duty was owing to him. 
The plaintiff's main reason for offering the photo-
graphs of signs posted after the accident was to show 
that the plaintiff was not a trespasser. *i 
The court ruled as a matter of law that the plain-
tiff was not a trespasser at the time and place of the 
accident and that the photographs of the signs posted 
after the accident were not admissible (R 815). 
*i See argument of plaintiffs counsel (R 801): 
MR. ROBERTS: Those pictures are before your honor for 
admission, that you haven't ruled on them yet. 
THE COURT: I see. Then what you intend to do would be 
to argue to the jury, these are taken, well, sometime after 
the accident. Would that be your purpose; wouldn't it? 
MR. ROBERTS: To show that there is no trespass. . . . 
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(The Court) "The court also finds that this 
plaintiff was not a trespasser at the time and 
place in question of this accident. 
And the court also will not permit any fur-
ther Exhibits or evidence or anything of that 
nature in connection with the remedial steps 
taken." (R 815). 
This ruling obviated the plaintiff's request to admit 
the photographs. 
The trial court should be granted discretion in rul-
ing on the admissibility of this type of evidence. 
H e should consider the policy of the law; to en-
courage precautionary measures taken after accidents 
to prevent further injury. He must weigh this policy 
against the reason for which the evidence is offered. 
In this case none of the reasons for which the photo-
graphs were offered were valid. 
Mr. Raymond's admission that the signs were avail-
able and could have been posted; the statement of plain-
tiff's counsel that the Exhibits were not offered to show 
negligence; and the court's ruling that the plaintiff was 
not a trespasser as a matter of law eliminated the rele-
vancy of the proposed Exhibits, 
I t is respectfully submitted that the trial judge did 
not commit prejudicial error in refusing to admit these 
photographs into evidence. 
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P O I N T V 
T H E T R I A L COURT DID NOT U N R E A -
SONABLY R E S T R I C T P L A I N T I F F S COUN-
S E L I N CLOSING A R G U M E N T . 
After the court ruled that the jury would not be 
advised of the effect of the comparative negligence, the 
question arose as to how far counsel could go in argu-
ing the negligence of each party. 
The following colloquy occurred between the court 
and counsel: 
MR. R O B E R T S : In reference to this matter 
of telling the jury why we cannot under your 
ruling comment on the effect of it, of the per-
centage findings, would there be any prohibi-
tion against urging them to find the defendant 
more responsible than the plaintiff, things like 
that, without telling them what the percentages 
are? Now it seems to me that is certainly fair 
comment and fair argument. I urge you to. 
T H E COURT: Yes. Let's go further. I think 
each one of you can urge that your party was 
not negligent at all, that the whole contributing 
cause of this accident and negligence was the 
other party. 
MR. R O B E R T S : Or if he was negligent, we 
think it was relatively slight with that of the 
power company, or something like that. I think 
that is certainly fair game. 
T H E COURT: You would agree to that? 
MR. N E B E K E R : I would agree with the 
court's statement that counsel could argue that 
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he thinks his client was not negligent and the 
other party was, or vice versa. The danger with 
getting into this slight or greater than may be 
a little hazardous. I am not sure about that. But 
I think it depends on how it is stated and what 
inference is given to it as to whether or not there 
is an effect. I think you have to be very careful 
in explaining that to the jury. 
T H E COURT: I think each party can argue 
within legal bounds that their own client was 
either not negligent at all or very, very slight 
and that the other party was grossly negligent 
or almost the only negligence, but no mention 
of the fact that the money award depends on 
the degree. See what I mean? Even like a 
ten-ninety or anything else. Stay away from any-
thing like that, and especially don't even get 
near that fifty-fifty thing. 
MR. ROBERTS: Yes. 
MR. N E B E K E R : I think that is proper. (R 
816-817) 
This subject was again discussed by the court and 
counsel just before the matter was submitted to the jury. 
MR. N E B E K E R : My request is that going to 
the judge's ruling that we not argue the effect 
of the comparative negligence, I think that is 
what the court has ruled, and I think maybe we 
should have that ground rule understood. 
T H E COURT: I think it should be understood 
that in making your arguments with respect to 
liability that of course neither side will mention 
the effect of the percentage application or allo-
cation of negligence that they are going to be 
asked in the verdict. If you mention blame and 
negligence I think it should be done in the con-
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text of in every case urging the jury that your 
client is entirely free from negligence, and that 
the cause of this action was caused by the negli-
gence of the other party. 
MR. R O B E R T S : I think we should argue that 
comparatively speaking the negligence of the 
power company is substantially more than the 
negligence of our client, if any, we believe. 
T H E COURT: That part is all right. But 
don't mention the word percentage or refer to 
that particular question they have to answer in 
connection with your argument at all, because 
I will instruct them on that. Do you see what 
I mean? 
MR. R O B E R T S : We have to have some way 
to get to it. Can't we say they will be asked to 
answer certain questions and without trying to 
attribute the responsibility to the two parties, and 
we would urge that as between the two our 
client is not responsible at all, or if so, very lit-
tle, and the power company is very responsible, 
and we've got to be able to argue that. 
T H E COURT: I think you can go that far. 
MR. R O B E R T S : I want the record at the 
same time to show our exception to this, and we 
think the jury ought to know what they are do-
ing, and I am sure we have already made our 
record on that. (Mr. Roberts was excepting to 
the ruling by the court that the jury would not 
be informed of the effect of their answers to the 
special interrogatories). (R 825-826) 
The court, in stating that counsel should stay 
away from that "fifty-fifty thing" was directing that ad-
monition to defendant's counsel, not plaintiff's counsel. 
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Inasmuch as this 50-50 argument has been effec-
tively utilized by defense counsel, the court properly 
advised counsel for both sides to avoid such argument. 
The court gave counsel for both parties the right 
to argue the relative negligence of each party. Certainly 
there was no prejudice to the plaintiff by this "ground 
rule." I t prevented the 50-50 argument which was 
what the court was trying to avoid. 
Since both counsel observed the "ground rules" 
stated by the court, there was no prejudice to the 
plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
This Interlocutory Appeal presents an important 
issue regarding comparative negligence law: whether 
the jury should be informed of the effect its answers 
have on the final outcome of the case. Appellant has 
demonstrated that every other comparative negligence 
jurisdiction, including our sister states of Idaho and 
Colorado, have adopted the "no comment rule." Since 
this case was tried under Idaho law, the whole of that 
state's comparative negligence law should be recognized 
and applied by the Utah court. Furthermore, it is 
respectfully submitted that Utah should also adopt the 
policy under our new comparative negligence act. Only 
through such a rule can the concept of the juries func-
tion as a strict fact-finding body be preserved. 
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The trial court did not commit prejudicial error by 
refusing to admit the photographs of the signs nailed 
on poles bordering the accident area a few days after 
the accident happened. 
The trial court did not unreasonably limit plain-
tiff's counsel in closing argument. 
Therefore, the trial court's order granting a new 
trial should be reversed and the jury verdict and judg-
ment of no cause of action should be reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, Q U I N N E Y & N E B E K E R 
S T E P H E N B. N E B E K E R 
P A U L S. F E L T 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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